the authenticity of these lines, 2 adding that this imputed motive for her action bordered on the comic. Hegel, by contrast, took seriously Antigone's claims about the irreplaceability of her brother and interpreted them in terms of the desire for mutual recognition. "Recognizing and being recognized," he writes, "can here assert its right, because it is linked to the equilibrium of the blood and is a relation devoid of desire. The loss of the brother is therefore irreparable to the sister and her duty towards him is the highest." 3 I argue that Antigone's speech figures so prominently in Hegel's treatment of the play not only because recognition is central to Hegel's philosophy but also because Hegel appreciates the significance of the brother, with whom, alone among men (says Hegel), a woman can share ethically equal recognition. Against Luce Irigaray's dismissal of Hegel's claims about the brothersister relation, 4 I take Hegel to have hit on a truth that is important for understanding women in the context of the emerging market economy of Hegel's day. The ethical equality in the brother-sister relation (evident in Hegel's relation to his sister, Christiane) is symbolized by Antigone's burial ritual. The brother is for the sister a source of the ethical recognition that is not found elsewhere, in marriage or in civil society.
In the early nineteenth century, German-speaking Europe was becoming a market-based economy in which what Axel Honneth calls "the individualistic achievement principle" arose "as a new criterion of social esteem after the dissolution of the estate-based status hierarchy." 5 For Hegel, the ideal form of exchange between rational, self-determining, and self-conscious agents is reciprocal recognition. The normative ideal is for individuals to recognize and value each other's rationality. However, as H. S. Harris writes, "a judgment of equality can only be rendered in the struggle, through the death of both parties." 6 Harris adds that Hegel had in mind here Polyneices and Eteocles, who kill each other in a battle for sovereignty. Neither one bests the other, and neither one survives. If both parties survived the confrontation, then the relation would be that of master and slave, where one party recognizes, and submits to, the authority of the other who does not reciprocate the recognition. In civil society, there may be reciprocal recognition of formal equality, but particular individuals are engaged in relations of domination and submission with each other. As Hegel writes in the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Philosophy of Right), we can speak of equality as an abstract right in which the person "has not yet been particularized or established as distinct in some specific way." 7 "Any judgment," Harris continues, "that effectively displays the doubling within the unity (as a 'play of forces' which both parties, and the outside observers can see) must be a verdict of settled inequality. That inequality, moreover, must be the logical inequality implicit in naïve desire. . . . One side becomes the controlling desire, the other the willing instrument." 8 In other words, the relation between the two self-consciousnesses, seen as a relation between two forces, must have the form in which one or the other of the parties, as a force, has power over the other. This is necessarily the case, according to Harris, because the very idea of force requires that it have influence over something else: force must be conceived as having an effect on something that either resists or succumbs to its power. 9 As a force, the dominant consciousness who wins the other's recognition is able to assert his will; the consciousness that bestows the recognition acknowledges the other's authority, is compelled by the other's power, and subordinates himself to the other because he sees that the master's claims have greater force than any of his own.
Honneth writes that, beginning with the System der Sittlichkeit (System of Ethical Life, 1802), Hegel sought to accommodate Hobbes's insight that the public sphere is an arena of "hostile competition" by developing a theory of social cohesion in which individuals affirm their freedom through ethical bonds forged in conflict. 10 The reason that these ethical bonds are forged through conflict lies in the idea of one-way recognition that Hegel presents in the Phänomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of Spirit). Civil society is an arena of competing interests, a play of desiring forces in which there are always stronger and weaker parties. Jean Hyppolite writes that it is actually its own desire that selfconsciousness desires, 11 and that it is only in the "for-itself" of the other that self-consciousness can glimpse its reflection as a desiring being. Hegel writes that "this other is for itself only when it supersedes itself as being for itself, and is for-itself only in the being for itself of the other" (PG, 129; PS, 112). Thus the only way for self-consciousness to comprehend itself is to experience its own reflection in others. To desire its own desire, as Hyppolite understands it, is to desire to see its own desire reflected in the for-itself of the other. By contrast, John Russon, following Harris, places the emphasis here on the power of desire as a force. Russon writes that it is actually the desire of the other that selfconsciousness desires, not its own desire, as Hyppolite argues. For Russon, self-consciousness as desire is a center of activity that seeks to project its own form on the world. Primitive desire is the desire to be the center of all reality, to be the central determining force of experience. "Whenever we act on a desire," Russon writes, "we reshape the world according to ourselves, and thereby demand that reality acknowledge our primacy, our centrality." 12 To desire the other's desire is therefore to try to reshape it according to my desire. Self-centered and desiring self-consciousness gains confirmation of itself in the other's eyes only when the other has "become a receptacle for [desiring self-consciousness's] determining power." 13 So, as Russon adds, for Hegel, success cannot be found in killing the other with whom one struggles, because it is not the other's mere presence that is the threat, and the other's death would not satisfy the desire to determine the other's desire. The threat that the other poses is, then, its remaining unchanged by self-consciousness. As Russon puts it, the threat "is precisely that nothing the one desire does to any presence has any determining significance for the other desire." 14 Satisfaction of desire, on Russon's view, can be found only where the other desire recognizes the first desire as dominant and is compelled by the force of the first desire's claim. Desire is the desire to have "the other desire determine itself to be determined by the first desire." 15 Satisfaction of desire is found only where the other, with whom self-consciousness engages in this struggle for dominance, recognizes self-consciousnesses' authority and recognizes himself to be determined by it. In this way, on Russon's reading, self-consciousness fulfills its own desire, by first recognizing and identifying with its image in the for-itself of the other. Russon emphasizes that it is not just reflection in the other's eyes per se that is desired. For primitive desire is the desire to dominate-to determine the other's desire, and to have the other acknowledge that dominance. We must recognize ourselves as being for the other, as dependent on the other's recognition, but we also want to return into ourselves from the image of ourselves in the other who recognizes our authority, our superiority. Desiring self-consciousness is satisfied that it is recognized when it has influence. This Hegelian community of mutual recognition, or play of forces as Harris and Russon understand it, is a sphere of conflict, as Honneth understands it. This is because identity is formed in ethical bonds that themselves result from a struggle in which self-consciousness tries to establish itself as an authority in the for-itself of the other who may, instead, disregard it. The threat is not that one might be disrespected (as Honneth says) but that one might be ignored (as Russon puts it). As a play of forces, the community of mutual recognition is one in which agents compete to compel others by the force or authority of their words. Individuals must "acquire the capacity to pursue and fulfill their own ends from others," writes Siegfried Blasche, "since this is the only way they can secure their own subsistence within the context of the market." 16 In a free market economy of the sort that was emerging in Hegel's time, this also means, as Hegel was surely aware, that financial rewards would accrue to those who are respected as authorities. They will rise to the upper class through the multiple processes of exchange in civil society that manifest the underlying struggle in which self-consciousness wins the recognition of others and is rewarded for it.
Hegel writes in the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts that, at the stage of abstract right in which there is formal equality, "we may not speak of the injustice of nature in the unequal distribution of possessions and resources, since nature is not free and therefore is neither just nor unjust" (PR, no. 49). The idea of justice that figures in the notion of formal equality is a product of freedom, not of nature. At the level of abstract right, the idea of formal equality is not integrated with the actual inequality of particularity, for it is only with the play of forces in the community of mutual recognition that we get the actual inequality at the level of particularity. Hegel argues that the moral wish 16 for everyone to have subsistence is articulated in an effective, concrete form in the further development of thought through which freedom becomes concrete (PR, no. 49), and the free market is stabilized in the recognition of the resulting attendant types of social standing. Through the integrating activity of the state "the rights of individuals and groups are not to remain abstract and ineffective." 17 As opposed to the formal equality at the level of abstract right, in actuality there is economic inequality in a market economy. As a result, Hegel felt that the development of individual personality "requires the stabilization of the market through corporations [such as guilds in Hegel's terms] and other social institutions," 18 which would represent the interests of particular social groups. Without the corporations, he thought, those who are least advantaged by the downward pressure of the market would have no way to collectively represent their interests. 19 Harris, also writing on the System der Sittlichkeit, claims that Hegel, from his earliest work to his latest, believed that the government must seek to regulate the economy that, unchecked, would produce vast inequality. " [Adam] Smith's gospel of free trade," writes Harris, "is the reflective doctrine that [Hegel] wants to overcome." 20 The government must seek to regulate the economy precisely because, Harris continues, "the rationalization of labor and commerce has produced an 'incalculable power' in whose grip the individual is helpless." 21 The "negative absolute" he opposes to natural law in the 1803 Naturrecht (Natural Law) essay is the inorganic infinite generated by the general pursuit of private economic interests, and it needs to be resolved and integrated into ethical substance [Sittlichkeit] . Like Smith's invisible hand, the work of each and all would resolve into a "universality established behind the backs of individuals and never [directly] through their doings." 22 In the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, the free market, seen as the negative absolute of civil society produced by the play of desiring forces, would be managed by external structures, such as the state bureaucracy and the corporations. The private sphere of unreflective ritual and the habitual daily practices that guide the citizen in his practical judgments would ultimately yield a particularity that expressed itself in civil society in competing economic interests whose excesses would need to be externally administered. Ethical life is the totality formed by the integration of these moments. The moment of legal administration is essential to it. Seyla Benhabib points out that Hegel recognized, anticipating some recent economic theory, 23 that the "negative absolute" that works behind the backs of each and all is not natural but caused by human beings' freedom and agency, and its excesses cannot be justified by recourse to natural law. As Harris writes, "Legal universality, equal citizenship and reverence for the laws are the integrating moments of Sittlichkeit." 24 Individuals must be able to develop their particular talents within a state in which the interests of the group to which they belong are represented. Through the corporations, the moral wish that everyone have subsistence is realized through a representative political body that integrates abstract equality and particular inequality.
Hegel thought that women would not seek confirmation of their identity from the play of desiring forces. He thought that their ethical bonds would not be forged in the struggle for recognition, for they would not seek the recognition that comes with establishing oneself as influencing others in civil society. Hegel writes that a man possesses "as a citizen the self-conscious power of universality, he thereby acquires the right of desire and at the same time, preserves his freedom in regard to it" (PG, 300; PS, 275). That is, he struggles in the public sphere to have his desire recognized and his freedom established. He struggles for the rewards that accrue to the victor of the struggle in the market economy. Women, however, have an interest "centered on the universal and remain alien to the particularity of desire" (PG, 300; PS, 275), where the desire in question is desire for dominance. Because the woman has "an admixture of particularity," "her ethical life is not pure, but in so far as it is ethical, the particularity is a matter of indifference" (PG, 300; PS, 275). Hence she is "without the moment of knowing herself as this particular self in the other partner" (PG, 300; PS, 275). In other words, her particularity is indifferentshe does not seek to establish her particularity as universal, as making a mark and being normative for others. Her particularity is without stature. centered on the universal that is established by others beyond her own particularity. By contrast, for Hegel, men seek to establish their own particular right of desire as universal, as dominant and as normative for others. Since women supposedly lacked this desire to establish their particularity as universal, Hegel thought that they would not struggle for dominance with other self-conscious agents in a community of mutual recognition. He inferred that they would shrink from having their particularity confirmed in the for-itself of an other compelled by the force of the significance of their words. Consequently, they would gain no recognition of authority from another agent. Instead, they would establish their ethical bonds within the family, or at least outside the marketplace of exchange in the emerging market economy, where the exchange of recognition takes place. Therefore the recognition that Hegel understands Antigone to lose when she loses Polyneices is not that of someone who recognizes her authority or the power of her being-for-self in the sphere of desiring forces. Instead, it is reciprocal ethical recognition, perfect equality. Hegel argues that the value of what Antigone loses was the equality of reciprocal recognition, the ideal form of exchange between two self-conscious beings that Hegel considers normative. Hegel's view is that such actual equality of determinate particularity (not abstract universality) occurs only on the death of both parties or in the brother-sister relation.
Honneth distinguishes between three types of recognition that correspond to the three spheres of the modern state in Hegel's Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. 25 The three spheres are the family, civil society, and the legal infrastructure that integrates the private and public spheres through law. For Honneth, the type of recognition proper to the family is unconditional love. Family members take each other's ends as their own and seek to advance each other's ends through mutual love and support. The family is thus an immediate prereflexive unity. In the institution of civil society, agents compete in the public sphere to advance their own individual ends, sometimes in cooperation and sometimes in competition with each other. It is, as Frederick Neuhouser writes, the sphere of atomization. 26 Here agents mutually recognize each other's rationality and achievements and try to fulfill their own ends in a sometimes hostile space of conflict and competing aims. The legal infrastructure of the modern state formally recognizes all citizens as equal, regardless of merit. Like familial love, the formal recognition that characterizes the state's legal apparatus is unconditional. But love, unlike the formal recognition of equality, is partial. Only some particular others in a narrow sphere are loved. The brother-sister relation is an immediate bond of love deriving from the immediate sphere of the family. It is not recognition of merit or achievement in civil society, and it is not mutual recognition of shared rationality. It is not contingent on the particular being-for-self that distinguishes one's self-consciousness from others in the community of mutual recognition. The brother-sister relation is an organic, immediate bond formed in the unreflective ritual practice of family life, one that is unconditional (like legal recognition) but partial. It is not universal or formal, because it is exchanged among particular self-consciousnesses who are directly familiar to each other.
Goethe asks why equal reciprocal recognition cannot occur with Ismene, Antigone's sister. "I should think," he writes, "that the love of sister for sister was still more pure and unisexual." 27 For Hegel, though, the importance of the judgment of equality in the brother-sister relation is that man and woman represent the Hegelian polarities of ethical substance (as characterized in chapter 6 of the Phänomenologie). Man and woman respectively represent the human and divine laws of the ethical order, where the former is a matter of the nation's explicit, written law, while the latter is bound up with the unreflective, implicit norms that guide the citizen in his habitual practice. 28 Normally, the two polarities cohere with, and reinforce, each other in the life of the ethical community. They are mutually dependent, and ethical life depends on their difference but coexistence. The brother and sister, male and female, represent these two orders of ethical substance in a harmony of mutual recognition uncorrupted by either sexual desire or the desire for dominance. Here, as Hegel writes, "the two ethical powers give themselves an individual existence and actualize themselves in the two sexes" (PG, 305; PS, 280). By contrast, Antigone is in conflict with Creon, and her relationship with Haemon is mixed with natural passion. So it is only in her relationship to Polyneices that the two laws exist in harmony, in an equal reciprocal recognition devoid of both sexual desire and desire for dominance.
Hegel writes of the brother and sister: "They do not desire one another, nor have they given to or received from one another this independent being-for self: on the contrary they are free individualities with regard to each other" (PG, 299; PS, 274). That is, they do not get confirmation of their identities from each other, as one would in relation to either a spouse or another agent in the public sphere of mutual recognition. The recognition is recognition of unique particularity and thus is not abstract formal recognition. So it is like recognition of merit in civil society in that it is recognition of particularity, but it resembles the recognition of formal equality in being unconditional. The value of the being-for-self of the brother and sister does not derive from their recognition of each other. They love each other at the unconscious level of immediacy in the intimate bonds of family. Their individual being-for-self is thus free from the dependence on recognition of the other: they are free individualities. The equality of the reciprocal recognition of particularity in the brother-sister relation consists precisely in each being-for-self's lack of dependence on recognition.
The family's immediate unity is forged from bonds of natural feeling. For the brother-sister relation to become ethical, rising from nature to the level of spirit, the sister must lift the natural event of her brother's death into the ethical order by performing the burial ritual. The two laws coexisting in harmony thereby take on truly ethical unity. That is, their unity lies beyond the mere natural blood relation, inhabiting instead an ethical dimension. The ethical substance of the relation of harmony between the sexes reflected in the two types of law (unreflective, divine law, and explicit, reflective law) is formally rendered actual and substantial by the ritual.
In the progress of the Phänomenologie Antigone's burial ritual and the wrath it provokes in Creon destroy the Greek ethical order, opening the way for the formation of modern political institutions. But the Hegelian process of sublation is a preservation as well as an operation of cancellation. The Aufhebung (sublation) both elevates and cancels; it elevates the opposition between divine and human laws into a new dimension. Antigone's burial ritual initiates the process of overcoming the dichotomy between the divine and human spheres as separate opposed spheres, but it also establishes the enduring nature of the mutual dependence of the two polarities. Immediate unconscious norms and the reflective publicly endorsable norms are dependent and mutually reinforcing, even in modernity.
The relation between husband and wife is ethical, because vows have been exchanged and the relation subsists in law or is elevated in ritual (PR, no. 163), but marriage does not represent the equality of the two laws of the ethical order, because the husband in the bourgeois marriage does not recognize the wife as his equal and her particular being-for-self is not independent of his recognition. The natural elements of passion and mutual attraction are rendered ethical by the formal marriage union, which offset the arbitrariness of sensuous inclination and make the union substantial and actual (PR, no. 164). There remains still a sensuous aspect, but it is now lifted into the context of a formalized ethical bond, which is recognized by the community. The partners have relinquished their independent existence in favor of a bond that is elevated and purified of transient caprice and contingency. At the same time, the partners have also adopted roles that are rigidly prescribed by the structure of the institution. The man occupies another ethical sphere in addition to the family, civil society, in which he struggles to establish what Hegel calls his "right of desire." He there seeks recognition. By contrast, the woman's sole vocation rests in the ethical sphere of the family, where her productive activities sustain the family's ethical substance, as well as the universality of each family member. Thus, while the sorts of mutual recognition at stake in marriage and in the brother-sister relation both lack the struggle for dominance that attends desire in the hostile arena of civil society, the marriage union, because of its prescription of roles, is inherently unequal. Only the relation to the brother affords women equal reciprocal recognition of particularity that is void of both sexual desire and the desire for dominance.
Irigaray writes that the relation between the brother and the sister cannot be reciprocal, as Hegel suggests. " [Hegel] affirms that the brother is for the sister the possibility of recognition of which she is deprived as a mother and a wife, but does not state that the situation is reciprocal. This means that the brother has already been invested with a value for the sister that she cannot offer in return except by devoting herself to his cult after death," 29 she writes. For Irigaray, the brother is the possibility of a kind of recognition from an agent in the public sphere that the sister, because she is confined to the roles of mother and wife, cannot in turn offer to the brother. Therefore the sister's recognition of the brother, in Irigaray's view, would not have the same value for the brother.
For Judith Butler, the process of recognition in the Phänomenologie involves "an uneasy dynamic in which one seeks to find oneself in the Other only to find that this reflection is the sign of one's expropriation and self-loss." 30 This is because, in the desire for recognition, consciousness "seeks a retrieval 29. Irigaray, "Eternal Irony," 217. 30. Judith Butler, Antigone's Claim: Kinship between Life and Death (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 14. Butler offers a psychoanalytic analysis of kinship and how the incest in the ancient Theban trilogy confounds standard kinship structures. She is concerned to show that if the incest is taken into consideration, Oedipus is also Antigone's brother. By contrast, the present study contextualizes the Antigone myth, not in terms of incest or sexual desire but in light of the modern bourgeois family and the competitive sphere of civil society. I treat desire as primarily desire for economic dominance in the context of the emerging market economy of Hegel's time.
of itself, only to recognize that there is no return from alterity to a former self but only a transfiguration premised on the impossibility of return." 31 In making these claims, both Butler and Irigaray overlook the variety of forms that recognition can take in Hegel. Neither critic interprets desire for recognition as desire for economic dominance, and they do not avail themselves of Hegel's three types of recognition, the three that are proper to the three spheres of modern society in the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (love within the family; recognition of merit in the sphere of civil society; and formal, legal recognition of equality). Moreover, they do not attend to the distinguishing features of the unique brother-sister relation (for Hegel). Thus, while it is true (as Butler says) that consciousness is transformed through recognition, the brother and sister do not seek themselves and cannot lose themselves in recognition of each other. For neither the sister's nor the brother's particular identity, their being-for-self, is derived from the recognition of the other. The brother and the sister are "free individualities" because they do not depend on recognition from the other for their being-for-self. They thus derive a sense of the independence of their being-for-self from the unconditional recognition of their particularity by the other. This is possible only in the familial context of siblings who do not desire each other sexually.
So, for Hegel, only the relation to the brother affords the woman a relation of genuinely equal recognition of her particularity. Such mutual recognition is a natural equality of free individualities between two members of the opposite sex that is not constrained by the formal structure of the bourgeois marriage form. This is why, for Hegel's Antigone, the relation to her brother must be rendered ethical and why she will risk her life to perform the ritual, the ritual that alone can preserve the harmony of the two spheres in the ethical order. "The publicly manifest Spirit has the root of its power in the nether world," Hegel writes (PG, 312; PS, 287), and Antigone's burial ritual represents for him a manifest equality that cannot be attained through Antigone's marriage to Haemon. The ritual that provokes Creon's wrath saves the harmony between the divine and human laws, as mutually dependent ethical orders, and substantializes it as the actual ethical order. In the modernity that develops in the Phänomenologie after the destruction of the Greek ethical order, the reciprocal dependence of unconscious and conscious norms, divine and human laws, are preserved as distinct just as their opposition is destroyed. The harmony is sublated, both canceled and preserved by the confrontation. The mutual dependence between the unconscious and conscious elements 31. Ibid. of ethical life is lifted into a new dimension in the transition that concludes Hegel's discussion of the ethical order.
The ritual that preserves the unity of ethical substance must also, according to Hegel, involve the citizen as a universal (in the essence that he shares with all citizens), and it is only in death that Polyneices is freed from the particularity of his struggle with the world to become truly universal. In one sense, Hegel uses the term universality to refer to the demands of the ethical community and the shared ethical substance that binds members of the community to each other. In another sense, Hegel uses the term universality to refer to the abstraction from particularity that renders each individual identical to all others and therefore "universal." Hegel holds that women remain "centered on the universal" (PG, 300; PS, 275) in both senses of the term universal. That is, women attend to that common nature that makes every individual identical to every other one by caring for family members at the level of their shared bare humanity rather than in terms of the particularity that distinguishes them in the public world. Women also are the guardians of the ethical substance through which the community maintains itself at the level of ritual practice. The resources for our capacity to determine the saliences of our practical situations derive from the private sphere of the family with its unreflective ethical substance grounded in the rituals of everyday life. These resources resist articulation in the explicit public norms that structure the world of civil society. Hegel considers Antigone exemplary of devotion to the domestic gods, the immediate elements in which ethical substance is grounded. He also sees her as an ethical agent whose bonds with others are not forged in conflict but instead based on the universal. Hegel intends universal here both in the private sense of regarding other family members in their bare universality and in the sense of upholding the unreflective norms of ethical substance by which the community sustains itself. For Hegel, she does not return into herself from an understanding of her own particularity, authority, and dominance in the for-itself of the other who recognizes her; consequently, she relates to other family members not in terms of their particularity but only in terms of their universality.
Indeed, Hegel writes that to the woman, centered as she is on the universal, particularity is evanescent: "In the ethical household, it is not a question of this particular husband, this particular child, but simply of husband and children generally: the relationships of the woman are based not on feeling, but on the universal" (PG, 300; PS, 274). Sophocles had made this observation as well in Antigone's speech of defiance: "Had I children or their father dead, I'd let them moulder," proclaims Antigone. "I should not have chosen in such a case to cross the state's decree. . . . One husband gone, I might have found another; Or a child from a new man in the first child's place" (ll. 905-10). It is not the particularity of the other family members that she recognizes, not this or that particular accomplishment or view of the world that would be recognized in the public, competitive community of mutual recognition. Because she does not seek dominance in the market, she does not see the other as a particular challenge to be met in the public sphere: she is not engaged in finding a way to outdo the other and so is not focused on the other's particularity (as one would need to be if one were trying to meet a challenge posed by the other). She shies away from the community of mutual recognition and struggles for dominance, attending instead to what is universal in the other, apart from such struggles.
Europe's transformation into a market economy accelerated in the nineteenth century. Hegel's emphasis on Antigone's burial of Polyneices, and the equality of the brother-sister relation, must be understood not only in this context but also in the context of the changes in the norms governing marriage. These changes were precipitated partly by the economic changes through which agents came to be seen as rational subjects pursuing individual gain 32 in a world of denaturalized economic exchange. 33 They were also brought about by the liberalization that resulted from secularization and the Enlightenment ideals of autonomy, justice, and equality. With the advent of the market economy, the family itself became a different kind of economic unit, and with this change, the meaning of love evolved.
Before the nineteenth century, the norm was that the entire household was a productive unit engaged with the community mostly through barter. Then the increase in wage labor created the need for an adult member of the household to focus exclusively on domestic production. As Stephanie Coontz writes in her history of marriage: "Most families had to make their own bread, and the flour they bought came with bugs and small stones, and other impurities that had to be picked out by hand. As a result, in the early stages of the cash economy most families still needed someone to specialize in household production." 34 A segregation of tasks ensued as men became wage earners in the new economy, while women's traditional tasks (such as "growing food for the family and matters of survival but as acts of love. Women were now cut off from the cash economy because their household labor became more vital to the household than any remuneration women could earn on the market. A new division of labor was the inevitable result. Instead of seeing their bond as (primarily) an economic one, working on productive tasks and engaging jointly in barter with the outside world, husband and wife came to understand their togetherness as a case of being soul mates. 36 Their bond was no longer forged in side-by-side labor, cooperating for the survival of the household as an economic productive unit. Rather, their bond became primarily a matter of sharing a private domestic sphere, one sharply segregated from the public world of wages. Their bond was now mainly seen as a spiritual union. Although monogamous marriage clashed with what was increasingly thought to be the voracious male sexual drive, "guaranteeing [protection of] male domestic domination from state interference" made marriage an attractive compromise for men, 37 especially when it was combined with the idea, accompanying religious liberalization, 38 that sexual expression "could only be achieved in its most intense and enjoyable form within marriage grounded in mutual love." 39 "For most of history," Coontz writes, "it was inconceivable that people would choose their mates on the basis of something so fragile and irrational as love." 40 Not only were economic forces now requiring the marriage union to be grounded in something other than shared labor, but the Enlightenment idea of autonomy was supplanting arranged marriage with the idea of personal choice of one's partner. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment stressed individual rights and advocated the idea that all social relationships, including those between men and women, should be based on reason and justice rather than force. 41 Reason and justice between the spouses also came to be normative as the market economy expanded, because the idea of the free man came to accompany the idea that when a free man returned home to the private sphere from the sphere of wages, he "needed someone to come home to who would actually understand him." 42 The free man needed a sympathetic woman to complete him. 36 John Locke had introduced the idea that if a ruler exceeded the authority that the people gave him, he could be replaced, and this idea was carried over to marriage, which was now seen as a contract and in which both parties had to uphold their share in the new division of labor. "For the first time in five thousand years," Coontz writes, "marriage came to be seen as a private relationship between two individuals rather than one link in a larger system of political and economic alliances." 43 The basis for marriage, its "objective starting point," had become a choice on the part of each partner, who freely consented to the union. 44 Increased secularization and liberalization of religious authority were occurring in the nineteenth century as well. As religion ceased to have the central public role that it had once had and became a private matter, it was increasingly feminized because of the perception of woman as a guardian of the domestic sphere in which religion and values were transmitted to children. Religion was thus sharply segregated from the world of wages. "Human society passes through certain stages, e.g. hunter gatherer, agricultural, commercial," writes Charles Taylor in his history of the process of secularization. 45 "The [Enlightenment] male role as self-given law-maker," he writes, "was in many parts of Christendom difficult to combine with Christian faith. Christianity in modern times has often become feminized." 46 Seeing the source of authority in oneself was difficult to square with seeing the source of authority in God or a religious hierarchy. Women, who did not see themselves as selfruling lawmakers, did not have this conflict.
With the marriage bond now seen as a love relationship rather than an economic partnership, the love relationship between soul mates transformed sexuality from a procreative act to a spiritual one. 47 It came to be seen as the expression of a spiritual bond between free adults and was sharply separated from the public sphere of market competition and wages. With women as its spiritual anchor, the home became a shelter for men from the turmoil of economic and political life, a place where husbands could escape the materialistic world of wages and the "hostile competition" of the community of mutual recognition. The family also was increasingly privatized, and such 43 practices as the servants eating meals with the nuclear family were abolished in favor of meals where the parents took their meals alone with their children.
Taylor links the emergence of the modern family not only to the emergence of the market economy but also to secularization. Faith became linked to what Taylor calls the modern moral order. This involved internalizing a sense of discipline through publicly affirmed conversion to a denomination. In a more market-driven economy "the danger was of sinking into forms of behavior that were idle, irresponsible, undisciplined, and wasteful," Taylor writes. 48 Survival often depended on adaptation to new conditions such as work disciplines. Male forms of conviviality, such as gathering at the tavern, were targeted as "sloth" by the Protestant religious forms that linked order and faith. "The new understanding of order was family-centered," Taylor continues. "Order required the male to be a family man and a good provider; and this required that he become educated, disciplined, and a hard worker." 49 By acquiring this discipline, he would become a "free self-governing agent." In these Protestant forms, there was a sense of the individual's deep sinfulness and the powerful love of God that would, through grace, heal the wounds of sin. However, conversion would also "yield the fruit of an ordered life" 50 in which the man would responsibly provide for a family. He would be sober, industrious, and respectable. Since the Reformation, salvation had meant "putting order in one's life," but the notion was given additional fuel by the philosophies of the Enlightenment, which emphasized autonomy and selfdetermination.
The nineteenth century saw the development in the West of a market economy in which it was becoming the norm for men to understand their worth in terms of what they had done rather than through the position into which they were born. It also brought modern educational institutions that continued the exclusion of women. Indeed, women had been active intellectually in the salons and households of the eighteenth century. 55. Ibid. 56. "The segregation of work and domestic life into two separate spheres and the assignment of the former exclusively to men was one of the central socioeconomic transformations around 1800" (Beate Ceranski, "Transition toward Invisibility: Women's Scientific Activities around 1800," in Gleixner and Gray, Gender in Transition, 210).
57. Blasche writes that Hegel probably did not understand this type of family to be a merely "transitional" social form ("Ethical Life and Civil Society," 199).
opportunity of intellectual engagement with Beethoven and Goethe.
53 With the emergence of a new economy, women were excluded from all the institutions in which intellectual activity was formally promoted. "The creation of the modern male citizen, educated and guided by reason, and protected in private life by civil law" 54 was a hallmark of modernization. Along with it came the entrenchment of "the concept of sexual difference based in nature" 55 so that by the beginning of the nineteenth century "a dichotomous gender order had become the basis for social modernization." 56 Economic changes and the changes in the nature of the family led to changes in the understanding of women's nature. Not only was woman a spiritual anchor in the private sphere, segregated from the world of wages and grounding a sanctuary from it, but she also was conceived as naturally different. Hegel's Grundlinien der Philosophe des Rechts (1821) affirmed this dichotomous gender order and the concomitant ideas about the nature of woman. Hegel writes that
Man has his actual substantive life in the state, in learning, and so forth, as well as in labor and struggle with the external world and with himself so that it is only out of this diremption that he fights his way to self-subsistent unity with himself. In the family he has a tranquil intuition of this unity, and there he lives a subjective ethical life on the plane of feeling. Woman, on the other hand, has her substantive destiny in the family and to be imbued with family piety is her ethical frame of mind. (PR, no. 166)
Hegel affirmed as normative and rational the family's nuclear structure, now increasingly shaped by the dominance of the male wage earner over the female (with her devotion to domestic affairs). Hegel understood this bourgeois family structure to be a particular historical achievement of the nineteenth century. 57 As a historical formation, the roles of bourgeois marriage partners had been largely precipitated by the market economy and the emergence of wage labor. The bourgeois family was a function of market forces in the newly developing market economy, and Hegel's prescription of these roles as rational and right emerged from this given economic reality.
For the nineteenth-century bourgeois, the family was an economic unit that provided an efficient structure for the rearing of children. As the market economy grew and wage labor became the norm, household production and tutoring children devolved to women, who were freed from wage labor by their marriage. Marriage, especially bourgeois marriage, preserved property for inheritance, transmitted religion and values to the next generation, and provided, in contrast to the "hostile competition" of the public, a space of "warm safety and protectiveness," 58 as the feminist theorist Wendy Brown puts it. To this day the dominant political order views the private sphere of the family as a "haven in a heartless world." 59 Brown writes that this family structure, still normative today, is largely dependent on women's supportive role within it; indeed, women's role in the family is the unacknowledged support on which the modern notion of liberal autonomy, and thus of male public identity, depends. 60 It is much easier for a man to be a self-determined free agent establishing a right of desire in the marketplace if he is supported by the labor of a woman. This family, a newly normative historical formation brought about by economic, political, and religious forces, was identified and enshrined in Hegel's philosophical text as both normative and rational, but not as ahistorical. Hegel's concept of "the family as intimate ethical sphere becomes possible only once the satisfaction of needs is relegated to an independent system of economic life," 61 or to an external sphere through which the male head of household is to secure the family's needs.
However, the increasing normativity of the nuclear family and of marriages based on the idea of spiritual love in the nineteenth century hinged on evolving and multiple views of the meaning of love itself. In his history of nineteenth-century bourgeois culture, Peter Gay describes the relevant main current as the tension between romantic love and bourgeois marriage. Of the two, Hegel affirmed the bourgeois marriage. Echoing Hegel, Gay locates man "in the ugly world of business and politics; gratifying ambitions and searching out profits. . . . Woman for her part, guardian of the hearth and familial purity, has the time, the duty, nothing less than the sacred mission, to put love first."
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Further, Gay writes, respectable bourgeois "could not marry until the prospective husband had a secure position and adequate bank account." 63 Romantic love, however, was emerging as the new paradigm. The Romantics held that if love was to be truly mutual, as their ideals proposed, women must be given the opportunity to develop their capacities. True mutuality, the Romantics thought, would require "intelligent, wide-ranging conversation, from the play of wit, from companionable activities that an ignorant, unschooled woman, no matter how natively gifted, could never sustain." 64 For the Romantics, "love was a joint and extended expedition, calling for skill and maturity and the kind of experience that only years of loving, and loving more than one partner, could provide." 65 Indeed, their emphasis on imagination, experience, and experimentation called the idea of marriage, especially lifelong marriage, into question. 66 Despite Hegel's claim that the ritual that renders marriage ethical exalts the union, the Romantics thought that the bourgeois were incapable of "the kind of exalted union to which [they] aspired." 67 Friedrich Schlegel thought that the substantial element in marriage was love, not the formal element of ritual or the ethical bond as Hegel understood it (PR, no. 164 Zusatz).
As the idea of freely choosing a partner gained prominence in a world where political structures enshrined the value of economic freedom, and as democratic and egalitarian principles emerged, some marriages, under the influence of the Romantics, came to be based not on an ethical bond but on attraction alone. Many bourgeois still held to the principle of arranged marriage, but where the current of Romantic love in the culture appeared, the contingency of attraction became the sole basis of marriage. The otherwise transient caprice that Hegel offset with the stability of the ritual now sustained marriage and replaced aptitude for shared household production. Along with this development in the prescribed foundation of marriage came the liberalization of divorce laws. For the bourgeois, Hegel among them, the Romantics had "neither religion nor sound principles," 68 and the Romantics made the bourgeois uneasy. The bourgeois upheld the values of "virginity, monogamy, and purity" 69 and scoffed at the Romantic idea that imagination was indispensable to love, even if it was an idea as old as Plato. 70 Hegel was acquainted at Jena with August and Friedrich Schlegel, both of whom had unconventional marriages. 71 The Schlegels and others of their mind-set formed a group at Jena, centered on the journal Athenaeum. They sought to "transform bourgeois society through a new kind of art." 72 August's wife, Caroline, in particular, "possessed an independence of mind and spirit that attracted many of the men around her, but simply frightened others." 73 She maintained a correspondence with Goethe, Schiller, Novalis, and the other Schlegels, among others, in which she discussed "issues usually reserved for males, such as literature and politics, thus participating in the public sphere while remaining in the practice of offering merely private views." 74 However, Hegel, committed as he was to the bourgeois marriage form and women's role in spiritually anchoring it, "never had an easy time with independent women," and Terry Pinkard, in his biography of Hegel, writes that Hegel disliked Caroline Schlegel. 75 Much preferring the figure of Antigone, who sacrifices her life for the sake of the ritual prescribed by the domestic gods, Hegel was loath to see the free-spirited contingency of mutual attraction serve as the sole basis for the institution of the family.
For Hegel, the marriage relation was not to be a romantic relationship based entirely on sexual desire or mutual attraction. If desire involves the desire to compel the other's desire (in either a sexual or an economic sense), 76 it is difficult for it not to include the desire for dominance. Therefore the desire to be desired could not be the basis for marriage, since "marriage is essentially a religious bond" (as Hegel wrote to his fiancée, Marie von Tucher, in 1811), 77 and so must by its very nature exclude egoistic desire for dominance. As a union with ethical significance, he did not see marriage as based in the material 78 particularity of the partners (or in their desire) as would be the case in romantic love. As he wrote in the Grundlinien der Philosophe des Rechts, "The ethical aspect of marriage has consciousness of this unity as its substantive aim, and so in their love, trust, and common sharing of their entire existence as individuals. . . . The spiritual bond secures its rights as the substance of marriage" (PR, no. 163). The spiritual bond that was the basis of marriage was, for Hegel, a speculative unity in thought. In the Frühe Schriften (Early Theological Writings) fragment on love Hegel wrote in 1797 that "in the lovers, there is no matter; they are a living whole." 78 Mutual attraction is present, but it is not the speculative substantive element of the marriage. In marriage, the spiritual bond between the singular partners preserves its intellectual reasonableness and ethical meaning. In this preservation all contingency and the caprice of passion are subordinated to the speculative bond. The truth of the spiritual bond, Hegel wrote in the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, "proceeds only from the mutual, whole-hearted, surrender [ungeteilten Hingebung]" (PR, no. 167) of each individual personality. 79 This essentially religious bond also involves duty, in which the "particularizations of the temporal self step aside, particularizations which in actuality could cause trouble," Hegel wrote to his fiancée. 80 On the basis of the spiritual bond, the partners resolve themselves to mutual support (PR, no. 164).
Hegel's historically specific view was very unlike a recent reflection that sees marriage in the future as dispersed into a loose set of contracts that confer legal benefits on diverse partners. As Elizabeth Brake sees it, these "adult care networks" need not involve any spiritual bond or mutual dependence exclusive to two parties. 81 By contrast, Hegel's historically specific view was that in marriage the speculative substantive tie between just two partners would realize itself materially (äusserlichen Dasein) in mutual dependence and support (Beihilfe) (PR, no. 164; my translation).
While a contract involves mutuality because in a contract the parties "are regarded in their individuality as self-subsistent units" (PR, no. 163 Zusatz), for Hegel marriage is not simply a contractual relation. In marriage 82. For Hegel, because the natural difference between the sexes "is preserved through their intellectual reasonableness and ethical significance" (erhält durch ihre Vernünftigkeit intellektuelle und sittliche Bedeutung) (PR, no. 165; my translation), and because reason is historical, Hegel's view does not preclude same-sex unions. Reason is a product of freedom and history. A spiritual bond between same-sex partners can be seen as reasonable if an educated self-determining citizenry comes to see it, from within their place in history, as reasonable. That is, it is reasonable if it comes to reflect a rational and self-determining people's self-knowledge. Norms, such as the norm of love only between opposite-sex partners, can prove themselves inadequate, and so lose their grip. What Hegel's view does preclude, however, is marriage grounded in the caprice of sexual desire, rather than in a spiritual bond elevated through language into an ethical bond. There is no support in Hegel for the government attempting to legally coerce citizens to form essentially religious spiritual bonds only with members of the opposite sex. The truth of the spiritual bond "proceeds only from the mutual, whole-hearted, surrender [ungeteilten Hingebung]" of each individual personality (PR, no. 167). Such surrender could not in principle ever be coerced. Hegel's view does exclude polygamy because it is incompatible with the mutuality of a reciprocally shared spiritual bond.
83. Giorgio Agamben, the partners transcend the standpoint of contract and become spiritually one person. 82 Rather than compromise individual autonomy, this spiritual union is each partner's "liberation" (Befreiung) (PR, no. 162). In that union they gain autonomy; they attain substantive self-consciousness (substantielles Selbstbewusstsein), and their individuality is strengthened (PR, no. 162). While more diverse relationships deserve legal recognition (as Brake urges), we must not forget that only with the marriage relation, a relation between just two people, do we get the spiritual bond and the greater autonomy that issues from it. The substantial bond of marriage is speculative, or ideal, and it would be elevated into ethical significance in the language of ritual. In the language of ritual, the lovers publicly avow their exclusive spiritual bond. The oath has a self-referential performative character, writes Giorgio Agamben. "It refers to a reality that it itself constitutes," as he says. In it the agent "testifies to his reliability." 83 Agamben writes that religion and law are both institutions that arose out of this originary experience of putting oneself at stake in language. In the oath the agent testifies in the first person to the link between words and actions. 84 For Agamben, the experience of the binding power of language in the oath points to the ethical, not merely cognitive, relation between words and things. 85 In the marriage ritual the lovers promise to each other the truth of the relation between their words and actions, and the spiritual bond becomes an ethical one existing publicly in the element of language.
Yet Hegel chose an androgynous, unmarried woman to represent the feminine principle in both the Phänomenologie and the Grundlinien der Philosophie 87. Ibid., 121. 88. See Stephanie Coontz's conclusion to her history of marriage: "Marriage has substantial benefits for both husbands and wives. That is because most marriages are pretty happy . . . [but] it is still true that when women marry, they do more housework than they did before marriage. When men marry, they do less. Marriage decreases free time for women, but not for men" (Marriage, 310-12).
des Rechts. Antigone was neither a wife nor a mother. She was a parthenos, a virgin, a maiden. Thus she did not occupy what (for Hegel) was woman's ideal role, that of spiritually anchoring the private domestic sphere of the family. Friedrich Schlegel had characterized Antigone as having "overcome the designations of active and passive to male and female." 86 Although Hegel rejected Caroline Schlegel's spirit of independence and the new figure of womanhood that she represented, he nonetheless chose a woman who, like Caroline and his sister, Christiane, did not draw her identity from its expected source (for Hegel) in the bourgeois marriage form. Schlegel admired Antigone precisely because she "aspired to completion without the benefits of love." 87 Hegel, by contrast, with both his sister and the concept of recognition in mind, admired Antigone because of the way she valued the free recognition that could be given to her not by a husband but only by her brother.
Some political tracts of Hegel's day publicized the issue of women's equality and political rights, but it would be a long time before women attained these rights in German-speaking Europe. Christiane Hegel grew up in an environment with conflicting ideals about the role of women and the nature of love. In the bourgeois Hegel family, significantly different expectations were projected for brother and sister. It would not have been entertained as a possibility for Christiane either to advance to a high level of education or to establish a "right of desire" in the emerging market economy. Like other women of her class, she had no way to actualize her freedom through civil society. Yet she did not want to derive her identity solely from immediate familial bonds through a husband to whom she would surrender herself in a spiritual bond. For in marriage, because of the inequality of roles, she would not be recognized by a husband as a "free individuality." Today, as in Hegel's time, the bourgeois marriage form still leaves its mark on daughters when it is reflected in the parents' relationship with each other, as it still sometimes is, 88 and when the father and the brother have at their disposal exceptional economic resources with which to establish their rights of desire in the marketplace.
slights. "One earns the confidence of others all the more by having confidence in oneself, by acting independently so as to show oneself to others as a support for them," Hegel wrote to Christiane in 1814. 95 Christiane's relationship to Hegel was never reestablished on the same ground after a disastrous visit to his family. After her father died, she lived with a relative, received financial assistance from Hegel, and supported herself partly by working as a French tutor. She had a lively group of friends. 96 However, so strong was her attachment to Hegel, and so inconceivable to her a world without her brother, the source of authority that neither she nor others could see in herself, that she committed suicide several months after Hegel's death in 1831.
Pinkard attributes Hegel's choice of Antigone as representative of women to the experience of Christiane's filial loyalty and dependence. He writes that Christiane "lived vicariously" through Hegel. 97 Since she was excluded from the public sphere by the bourgeois norms of her family and the society at large, Christiane's connection to the public sphere could come from only two sources: her brother or her potential husband. The latter source would be unsatisfactory to her, since she would find no recognition of her autonomous being-forself from a husband. As Hegel says, the woman in marriage is "without the moment of knowing herself as this particular self in the other partner" (PG, 300; PS, 275). To the husband, she would not be a free individuality, for she did not have standing in civil society.
Her particularity is recognized unconditionally as free only by the brother, who is himself recognized as free by her. In the Hegel family Christiane had more limited options than Caroline Schlegel because of the patterns of recognition in the intimate bonds of family life, where the brother was dominant. Christiane and Hegel were not economic equals, and they were not constructed in family life as equals. Christiane was not recognized as an authority by the norms of family life. Yet without Hegel, Christiane could gain no unconditional recognition of her free particularity, either in the family or in civil society. The "ethically corrupted" civil society was not a place for women, 98 who could be recognized as having value (arising from their focus on the universal) only in private life as constructed in the bourgeois form. She could not expect equal mutual recognition in civil society. Only recognition by the brother would be recognition free from both the bourgeois marriage form and the market (with its prevalence of desire for dominance).
Hegel saw that women would prefer equality to dominance over others, devoted as they were to the universal, and thus would shrink from the play of forces in civil society (where such inequality was found). Women would focus on the universality of other family members. But Hegel also elevated Antigone, whose identity, like that of his sister, was not derived from a bourgeois marriage where her focus would be on attending to the universality of others. Antigone's identity was defined not by a spiritual bond with another free agent in marriage but by a choice that she could call her own, and by the fraternal recognition in light of which her being-for-self was a free individuality.
Because of the market's propensity to create inequality, Hegel thought that the economy should be regulated. He saw that the perfect equality between the sexes that is rendered ethical by Antigone's burial ritual is alien to the modern public sphere. Given the nature of desire and the economic processes that are driven by desire, the flip side of recognition is the prospect of being ignored, finding no recognition in the public sphere (as Russon recognizes). 99 Active disrespect is less common than simple disregard, 100 or being ignored, which is a by-product of the anonymous economic forces, which result from the interplay of the desires of each and all, for which no one can be directly blamed.
In sum, seen through a Hegelian lens, the prospect of equality in the modern era founders in public ethical life, from which women find, in the shadow of market forces and the bourgeois marital norms of recognition, a dichotomous gender order deeply entrenched in the economic system. Hegel realized that the brother is irreplaceable in his significance for the sister, because his relation to her bestows a recognition devoid of desire. Women's lives are still often structured by the bourgeois marriage form and the construction of women in it. Market forces continue to present obstacles to establishing a being-for-self derived from a "right of desire" in the marketplace. The brother and the sister, like the husband and wife in bourgeois marriage, do not necessarily recognize each other as economic equals. However, only in relation to the brother can the particularity of the woman's being-for-self be recognized as being independent of its recognition.
The equal, mutual recognition between the two laws of the ethical order is spiritually represented in Antigone's ritual. Her ritual elevates an equality that is not found elsewhere. Spirit's immediate ethical life involves the elevation and symbolic recognition of the ethically substantive, if not economically actual, equality between the sexes that is represented by Antigone's burial ritual.
